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Research reveals that a “finite pool of worry” constrains concern
about and action on climate change. Nevertheless, a longitudinal
panel survey of 1,858 UK residents, surveyed in April 2019 and
June 2020, reveals little evidence for diminishing climate change
concern during the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, the sample iden-
tifies climate change as a bigger threat than COVID-19. The find-
ings suggest climate change has become an intransigent concern
within UK public consciousness.
climate change | finite pool of worry | COVID-19 | longitudinal | United
Kingdom
The “finite pool of worry” hypothesis states that environ-mental and climate concerns diminish as other worries rise in
prominence (1, 2). Originally developed to explain fluctuating
environmental concern broadly (3), it has since been applied to
attitudes toward and action on climate change holistically (4–7).
Whitmarsh (8) and Weber (9) reveal effects of the 2008 eco-
nomic recession on perceptions of climate change—displacing
climate change concern, “expressed through doubt about the
reality or severity of the issue” (8).
If the “finite pool of worry” hypothesis were still a robust
explanation for concern about climate change, one might expect
health and economic concerns associated with COVID-19 to
reduce perceptions of climate change severity or reality. Never-
theless, the April 2020 Climate Change in the American Mind
survey found a relative lack of evidence supporting a “finite pool
of worry” (10). Further, UK data reveal increases from May 2019
to May 2020 in perceived urgency of climate change and support
for climate change mitigation policies—the opposite of what
“finite pool of worry” would predict (11). Both 2020 surveys were
based on relatively small sample sizes (United States n = 312,
United Kingdom n = 284), and their comparison with previous
surveys was via a repeated cross-sectional design—different
people responded to each survey. To assess the robustness of the
emerging findings, we conducted a survey with a large-scale
representative and longitudinal sample (n = 1,858) in the
United Kingdom—identical respondents in April 2019 and
June 2020.
Results
Beliefs about the extent to which climate change is real and
anthropogenically induced were measured 14 months apart, as
were beliefs about the seriousness of climate change. Of our four
measures of seriousness, three showed no significant difference
between April 2019 and June 2020 (paired-samples t tests)—only
seriousness of climate change for “you and your family” varied
(slight decrease in perceived severity of 0.10 on a 5-point scale).
Nevertheless, the effect size (Cohen’s d) was very small (0.09).
Of the five beliefs about climate change reality, four showed
significant differences at P < 0.05 (Table 1), but the Cohen’s
d (strength of the relationship) in each case was minimal, below
the 0.10 threshold for what is considered small (12), suggesting
minor differences were only made significant by the large sample
size. In each significant relationship there was slightly more agreement
in June 2020 that climate change was real and anthropogenically
induced.
Beyond the differences over time in our longitudinal panel,
the survey respondents specifically acknowledged the continued
relevance of climate change in the era of COVID-19. When
asked, “Which do you consider to be a bigger threat to the future
in. . . (1) the UK (2), Europe, and (3) the world?” COVID-19 was
perceived marginally as a bigger threat for the United Kingdom
(43% vs. 42%). Nevertheless, COVID-19 was perceived as less of a
threat than climate change by the plurality of the sample for Europe
(40% vs. 45%) and the world (33% vs. 55%) (unaccounted-for
percentages responded “neither” or “don’t know”). This survey
was conducted at a time when all four nations of the United
Kingdom were still in a relatively strict lockdown, and had been for
3 months.
Leading variables affecting propensity to state that climate
change was a bigger threat to the future than COVID-19 were
perceived climate change seriousness (average of four items); cli-
mate change being real (average of five items); support for decla-
ration of a climate emergency by the UK, Scottish, and Welsh
governments; being male; and liberal political orientation (Table 2).
To further explore the extent to which attention to climate
change evolved since COVID-19, Twitter data were collected,
specifically tweets with a geolocation attribute identified as
within the UK region, from 1 March 2019 through 17 August
2020 (∼124 million tweets). This dataset reveals that the per-
centage of attention to climate change compared to all other topics
on this social media platform decreased when COVID-19 emerged
in discourse. From March 2019 through February 2020, tweets in-
cluding the term “climate” comprised 0.145% of all UK geolocated
tweets (ranging from 0.104 to 0.232% on a monthly basis), but in
the period March to August 2020 “climate” tweets comprised
0.064% of the geolocated tweets (from 0.054 to 0.085% monthly).
In comparison, tweets including “covid” comprised 1.511% of UK-
geolocated tweets during March to August 2020 (Fig. 1).
Discussion
Our results in aggregate offer very little evidence to support the
hypothesis that a “finite pool of worry” is diminishing concern
about climate change. The 14 months from the first survey to the
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second survey included the endless barrage of exposure, both
direct and through mass/social media, to the effects of corona-
virus, but they also included mass protests by the youth climate
strikes and Extinction Rebellion, prominent news of Australian
wildfires and melting glaciers in Europe, and UK government
action on climate change through a legal commitment to net-
zero carbon emissions by 2050 and creation of a UK Climate
Assembly bringing together UK citizens to make recommenda-
tions for future action.
Perhaps the weight of such actions that could increase per-
ceived severity and reality of climate change balanced against the
effects of COVID-19 encroaching upon respondents’ finite pool
of worry. Nevertheless, the availability heuristic (13) and the
extreme psychological proximity of COVID-19 (14) would sug-
gest that COVID-19 should affect the UK respondents much
more substantially than socially distant events that occurred in
2019 (e.g., only 3% of our sample reported themselves or a
family member engaging in youth climate strikes, 3% for Ex-
tinction Rebellion protests, and 1% for the UK Climate As-
sembly). The Twitter data suggest that although attention to
climate change seems to have waned during the pandemic, this
does not directly translate into altered perceptions of severity or
reality of climate change.
While the findings certainly do not refute the existence of
people having a finite pool of worry, they might instead suggest
that over the decade since some of the previous research in this
area was conducted (8, 9) climate change may have increasingly
become a “permanent member” of more people’s pool of worry,
at least in the United Kingdom. Indeed, increased stability of
attitudes and beliefs as people gain more familiarity with a topic
has long been recognized (15, 16).
The intransigence of our sample’s beliefs about climate
change’s severity and reality could be positive or negative for the
realization of concerted action on climate change. That perhaps
the biggest news story and global crisis of most of our lifetimes,
with enormous health and economic repercussions, is not asso-
ciated with a decrease in perceived severity of climate change is
good news. A separate question of high policy import is what
events or communication would increase worry, and the extent to
which that worry would motivate concrete action.
We asked all respondents if they had read or heard about the
following in the last year: youth climate strikes (“Fridays for
Future”), Extinction Rebellion protests, Australian wildfires,
storms and flooding in the United Kingdom, melting glaciers in
the Alps and Greenland, and the UK Climate Assembly. None of
these had significant correlations (at P < 0.05) with respondents’
change in perceived climate change severity from April 2019 to
June 2020. This suggests climate change stories are not effecting
change in perceived severity. This cautions against being overly
optimistic about the capacity for climate change news and risk
communication to heighten issue concern. Again, however,
COVID-19 clearly could be a confounding historical event here.
Our findings suggest the “finite pool of worry” hypothesis in
relation to climate change requires more attention, and poten-
tially nuanced revision. Future research that examines climate be-
liefs, attitudes, and affect over periods of high societal attention to
climate change with few major conflicting crises could shed light on
the relationship, as could additional research that examines addi-
tional operationalizations of “worry” to include measures based
more on affect. Repeated cross-sectional survey data suggest a
similar pattern to ours (10, 11); does this ambiguity over finite pool
of worry extend to other national and cultural contexts? Finally, does
the obduracy of beliefs about climate change work both ways—will
perceived severity and reality of climate change increase in the ab-
sence of major COVID-19 concerns, or does a strongly reified set of
beliefs mean little change can be expected in either direction?
Materials and Methods
The longitudinal online survey was first conducted 8 to 12 April 2019 with
2,777 UK respondents, constrained with quotas to represent the UK pop-
ulation on age, sex, UK census region of residence, social grade, education,
party vote in the 2017 general election, vote in the 2016 EU (Brexit) refer-
endum, and attention paid to politics. The follow-up survey, 16 to 30 June
2020, attracted 1,858 respondents (67% from 2019).
The core questions replicated across both surveys, allowing for us to
compare evolution in perspectives on climate change, were a four-item scale
on beliefs toward seriousness of climate change (one factor, 82% of variance
explained, lowest loading at 0.82, and reliability alpha of 0.93) and a five-
item scale on beliefs about the extent to which climate change is real (one
factor, 68% variance explained, lowest loading 0.64, and reliability alpha
0.88). These items were replicated from reliable and valid measures used in
prior research (17); see SI Appendix for exact items.
Table 1. Change in beliefs about climate change from 2019 to 2020
Item Mean difference (T2 –T1) Significance Cohen’s d (effect size)
I am convinced that climate change is really happening 0.07 0.029 0.08
Claims that human activities are changing the climate are
exaggerated
−0.13 0.001 0.08
The evidence for climate change is unreliable −0.11 0.002 0.05
Climate change is just a natural fluctuation in Earth’s temperatures −0.11 0.001 0.07
The media is often too alarmist about issues like climate change −0.05 0.149 0.03
Table 2. Predictors of climate change as a bigger perceived threat than COVID-19 (binary logistic
regressions)
Variable




Odds ratio, threat to
the world
Climate change seriousness 1.68 1.66 1.42
Climate change is real 1.49 1.55 1.52
Support “climate emergency”’ declaration 1.33 1.31 1.40
Male (vs. female) 1.56 1.50 1.35
Very conservative to very liberal (7-point scale) 1.13 1.20 1.24
Statistical significance for the three climate change attitude/belief variables was P < 0.001 in all models; the two socio-
demographic variables had P < 0.05 in all models. Model pseudo-R2 values across the three models were Nagelkerke = 0.34 to
0.36 and Cox and Snell = 0.26 to 0.27.
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Our Twitter data come from a dataset of almost 124million geolocated UK
tweets analyzed using the Twitter Streaming API (application programming
interface) from 1 March 2019 through 17 August 2020. While this API is
known to filter the data stream, it does not impose a strong filter on tweets
with a spatial attribute due to their relatively low numbers; therefore, our
database contains the vast majority of geolocated tweets sent in the United
Kingdom during the time period.
Human subjects’ approval was granted by the University of Edinburgh’s
Social and Political Science ethics committee and the University of Exeter’s
Geography ethics committee. All survey respondents were asked for consent
to participate at the start of the survey and allowed to withdraw at any time.
Data collection was anonymous; no identifying information was collected.
Data Availability. Some study data are available.
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Fig. 1. Twitter attention to “climate” and “covid,” March 2019 to August 2020. Data are based on geotweets in the UK region; y axis depicts the ratio of the
maximum rate per month—1.00 is the month with the highest percentage of tweets about a term (either “covid” or “climate”).
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